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Introduction 
“Nuclear strategy” and “nuclear doctrine” are seldom used in Chinese literature of military and 
strategic studies. Instead “nuclear policy” frequently appears to cover both the strategic thinking 
and the basic principles in developing, managing, and employing nuclear weapons. This 
preference in terminology illustrates how the political utility of nuclear weapons occupies the core 
position in China’s nuclear calculus. The following paper will first analyze the current Chinese 
nuclear policy; then describe some of the major factors that may effect nuclear thinking in China 
after the Cold War; and finally speculate on the future of China’s nuclear deterrence in the 21st 
century. 
I. Current Chinese Nuclear Policy 
It can be safely said that of all the nuclear states, the nuclear policy of China has so far been the 
most consistent. From the day China first exploded an atomic bomb, its nuclear policy-related 
statements have remained unchanged. Five major components can be derived from these 
statements:  
No First Use Policy 
No first use (NFU) has been most frequently and consistently repeated in numerous Chinese 
government statements ever since China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964. By conceding 
the first use option, China has limited itself to retaliatory nuclear use only. China has also called 
all nuclear weapon states to commit themselves to a NFU policy at any time and in any 
circumstances.  
Security Assurance to Non Nuclear Weapons States and Nuclear Free Zones 
China has been very critical of the use of nuclear threats against non-nuclear weapon states and 
non-nuclear weapons zones. It has repeatedly called on all the nuclear weapon states to agree to 
a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. This policy 
component limits China’s potential nuclear adversaries to just the few nuclear weapon states. 
Apart from the negative security assurance, which China gives unconditionally to all non-nuclear 
weapon states, China issued its first formal positive security assurance with the other four 
declared nuclear weapon states in April 1995, promising to come to the aid of any non-nuclear 
weapon state subject to nuclear attack and pursue appropriate punishment against the attacking 
state, under the auspices of the UN Security Council. This policy has become part of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 984. 
Limited Development of Second Strike, Retaliatory Capability  
China has repeated its intention to maintain a very small nuclear arsenal on many occasions. In 
its 2003 Defense White Paper, China states that it “has always exercised utmost restraint on the 
development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the lowest level necessary for 
self-defense only.”[1] However, to make this small arsenal a credible deterrent, China has to 
make it survivable to a first nuclear strike, even that strike is overwhelming and devastating. In 
Chinese literature, “few but effective” (jinggan youxiao) are the words most frequently used to 
describe its necessary arsenal.  
Opposition to Nuclear Deployment outside National Territories 
China is opposed to the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or the policy of providing "nuclear 
umbrellas" by nuclear weapon states to their allies. In consistence with China’s long standing 
policy of not sending or stationing any troops outside China, it is also officially opposed to the 
deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China will never 
deployed nuclear weapons on any foreign soil. 
Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Thorough Nuclear Disarmament 
China first called for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in its 
proposal for a world summit in1963, before its first nuclear explosion. On the same day of China’s 
first nuclear explosion, it again stated that “the Chinese government hereby solemnly proposes to 
the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be 
convened to discuss the questions of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of 
nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference conclude an agreement to the 
effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers 
undertake not to use nuclear weapons either against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free 
zones or against each other."[2] This has evolved into China’s basic position on nuclear 
disarmament and it has never given up its efforts to promote an international convention to ban 
nuclear weapons. 
The above major components of Chinese nuclear policy, if interpreted through the lens of 
Western deterrence terminology, can be characterized as: 
Strategic Rather than Operational and Tactical Deterrence 
Mao Zedong, in elaborating China's reason to develop nuclear weapons, said “we will not only 
have possession of more aircraft and artillery pieces, but also atom bombs. In today’s world, we 
must have this thing if we don’t want to be bullied by others.”[3] The original purpose of nuclear 
development in China was to “break up the nuclear threat and smash the nuclear blackmail 
(dabuo he weixie, fensui he ezha).” As a political instrument, nuclear weapons are to be utilized 
mainly at the level of grand strategy, not as a winning tool in military operations. The military 
value of nuclear weapons lies only in its deterrent effect against nuclear attack. The officially 
declared missions of the Second Artillery Force are twofold:  
1. To deter the use of nuclear weapons against China, and  
2. To launch an effective nuclear counter-attack in the case of such an attack.[4]  
No distinction has been made in categorizing nuclear operations. A nuclear strike against 
China—whether conducted at strategic, operational or tactical level, with high or low yield 
warheads, or deadly or tolerable lethality—is perceived as the utmost form of warfare in Chinese 
war categorization, which must be responded strategically. In Chinese strategic literature, we only 
see the discussion on how to deter a nuclear war from happening, on how to prevent a 
conventional conflict from escalating into a nuclear war, and how to retaliate after suffering a 
nuclear attack—but never how to win a nuclear war. The primary Chinese perception is that 
nuclear wars are not to be won, but to be prevented.  
Retaliatory—Rather than Denial—Deterrence[5]  
Many Chinese cite Deng Xiaoping when explaining China's nuclear thinking. He explained, in a 
meeting with foreigners in 1983:  
"While you have some deterrence force, we also have some; but we don't want much. It will do 
just to possess it. Things like strategic weapons and deterrence forces are there to scare others. 
They must not be used first. But our possession will have some effect. The limited possession of 
nuclear weapons itself exert some pressure. It remains our position that we will develop a little 
(nuclear weapons). But the development will be limited. We have said repeatedly that our small 
amount (of nuclear weapons) is nothing. It is only to show that we also have what you have. If 
you want to destroy us, you yourself have to suffer some punishment at the same time."[6]  
Deng’s statement echoed Mao’s nuclear thinking in several aspects:  
1. Nuclear weapons are desirable only for its deterrent value, not for battlefield utility.  
2. Nuclear weapons, if ever used, will be used to cause the enemy as much pain as 
possible, so as to enhance its deterrent value in the first place. Therefore, China has to 
adopt counter-value as opposed to counterforce targeting strategies, in order to 
strengthen its deterrence posture.  
3. Only a small number of nuclear weapons will satisfy China’s deterrent needs—to 
convince potential nuclear adversary of a possible nuclear retaliation. Both Mao and 
Deng are very explicit that the deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion 
with numbers of nuclear weapons. A survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be 
equally effective in terms of deterrence. Deterrence effect depends on invulnerability to 
nuclear strikes, not on large amount of nuclear attack capabilities. Accordingly, what 
China has been seeking is a nuclear arsenal that is small in size but good in quality.  
4. As confined by its adherence to NFU policy, China has to focus its nuclear development 
efforts on “second strike capabilities” which must be credible and survivable in order to 
have deterrent effect.  
Central Rather than Extended Deterrence[7]  
By declaring to counter-attack with nuclear weapons only after being attacked by nuclear 
weapons, China has preserved nuclear capabilities to protect its own most vital interests—that is, 
the existence of the nation. Even during the Cold War years, China has never provided nuclear 
umbrella to any other country in the world. For China, the concept of extended deterrence has 
simply not entered into it nuclear calculus—yet.  
General Rather than Immediate Deterrence 
The mutual deterrence exercised by the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War had been 
directed at one another. They were both the ones to deter, and the ones to be deterred. They 
formed a bilateral deterrent relationship, in which each side was very clear whom it wanted to 
deter, and what it wanted to deter them from. Their deterrence was more of an immediate nature. 
China had never comfortably fitted into the bipolar context. It had been in one of the poles for 
some time, then outside of both poles for some time, and then it tried to be closer to the other 
pole. In addition, China had not had the luxury of a nuclear umbrella for most of the Cold War 
years. Therefore, China’s nuclear deterrence had been more of a general nature—in which China 
tried to form a multilateral deterrent relationship with all the nuclear powers, which only made 
clear what China wanted to deter.  
Defensive Rather than Offensive Deterrence 
One famous tenet laid down by Chairman Mao Zedong is the Sixteen Character Guideline for the 
use of force—“We will never attack unless we are attacked; and if we are attacked, we will 
certainly counterattack” (ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren ruo fan wo, wo bi fan ren). Behind this 
guideline is a sober headed analysis of power balances. The PLA and its predecessors entered 
and won most wars as an inferior side against great odds. So a defensive posture had always 
been preferred to an offensive one.  
However, Chinese forces have managed to turn from being the weaker into the stronger party in 
the course—usually a protracted course—of previous conventional wars. When applied to nuclear 
policy, this Guideline simply means a rejection of preemptive thinking. The renunciation of the 
first-use option, the willingness to accept vulnerability, the confinement to retaliatory nuclear use, 
the principle of attacking only after being attacked (hou fa zi ren), the focus on second strike 
capabilities, and the reservation of nuclear means as the last resort to protect only the most vital 
national interests, all point to the defensiveness of China’s nuclear policy. Although nuclear 
weapons are inherently offensive weapons, when deterrence strategies are applied in the way 
China does, they acquire a pure defensive posture.  
Minimum Rather than Limited or Maximum Deterrence 
If I am to choose from Western deterrence classifications to describe Chinese nuclear deterrence 
posture in general, I would have to use the handy concept of “minimum deterrence” as compared 
to maximum or limited deterrence. Personally, I think the word “minimum” has too strong a 
quantitative connotation that is misleading. It sometimes suggests a quantitative standard instead 
of a qualitative standard. The word “minimum” has for some time been officially used in Chinese 
government documents.[8]  
But what I want to emphasize is that Chinese strategists take the concept as a relative one, 
defined not only by pure numbers, but more importantly by such key criteria as invulnerability of 
nuclear forces, assurance of retaliation, and credibility of counter-attack. When a Chinese 
document says that China intends to possess nuclear weapons only at the minimum (or lowest) 
level for the needs of self-defense, that means to have the minimum but assured capabilities for a 
retaliatory second strike. Some studies have suggested a shift of Chinese nuclear posture toward 
limited deterrence, where China could employ nuclear weapons to deter both conventional and 
nuclear wars, and even to exercise escalation control in the event of a conventional 
confrontation.[9] However, the basic logic of China’s nuclear thinking dictates nuclear weapons as 
deterring—not as a means of winning against nuclear weapons. 
II. Factors Shaping China’s Nuclear Thinking after the Cold War 
Many factors have exerted an impact on China’s nuclear calculus since the end of the Cold War. 
Listed below are three major ones. 
Factor One: The Changing Nuclear Environment 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar international system led to the fall of 
nuclear weapons as a predominant strategic consideration. A major nuclear exchange has 
become just a remote possibility. Local limited wars, national and ethnic armed conflicts, territorial 
disputes, nuclear and military technology proliferation, international terrorism, and transnational 
organized crime have risen in significance as major threats to international and regional peace 
and stability.  
China’s nuclear environment has been more complex:  
1. First, the Strategic Partnership formed between China and Russia removed the prospect 
of a Russian nuclear first strike.  
2. Second, the possibility for military conflict between China and the United States (both 
nuclear powers) over Taiwan has increased.  
3. Third, there have emerged on China’s periphery two new nuclear weapon states—India 
and Pakistan, with the former explicitly taking China to be a nuclear adversary.  
4. Fourth, the DPRK is seeking nuclear weapons against the common wish that the Korean 
peninsula be nuclear free. Such move may result in cascading effects such as more 
robust BMD systems in the Northeast Asia region, which in certain cases would reduce 
the deterrent effect of China’s small nuclear arsenal; and potential incentives for Japan 
and even the ROK to go nuclear.  
Paradoxically, China evaluates its overall nuclear security to be improving instead of worsening—
although surrounded by more nuclear weapon states than any other in the world. Reasons for this 
evaluation are manifold:  
1. First, it would be too far fetched to envision a military conflict between China and Russia, 
let alone one involving nuclear confrontation.  
2. Second, China formed with India a very credible mutual deterrent relationship the 
moment it went nuclear. Pakistan, a long time friend of China, has been locked into 
amutual deterrent relationship with India as well. The pair of deterrent relationships 
brought about a more earnest effort from both India and China for settling territorial 
disputes by political means, and reduced the danger of large scale conventional conflicts 
between India and Pakistan.  
3. Third, China was less concerned about its two new nuclear neighbors, for the general 
nature of China’s nuclear deterrence can readily accommodate the changing nuclear 
deterrence needs.  
4. Fourth, China is actively engaged in the Six Party talks, and was confident that a nuclear 
free Peninsula can be achieved—which is in China’s best interests. So far and in the 
foreseeable future, changes in the nuclear environment pose no challenges so great that 
China has to reconsider its nuclear policy.  
Factor Two: Taiwan 
Taiwan hadn’t been a predominant issue until the mid 1990s, when the pro-independence forces 
gained momentum on the island. Cross-strait conflicts were a continuation of the 1945-49 civil 
war, and nuclear weapons had no role to play in civil war scenarios.  
However, the Taiwan issue has been complicated by possible U.S. military intervention in case of 
a military crisis. This constitutes the only conceivable scenario in which two nuclear weapon 
states might fight face-to-face. China has always complained, with good reason in my view, that 
the United States is the largest external factor impeding China’s reunification, peacefully or by 
force.  
With the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has somewhat committed itself to the defense 
of Taiwan. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released (or leaked) by the U.S. Department 
of Defense even implies the use of nuclear weapons in “military confrontation over the status of 
Taiwan.” Such confrontation is categorized as “immediate contingencies” for which the United 
States has to set “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities.”[10] So far, China has never—in 
any government statements or official documents—threatened nuclear use in the cross-strait 
conflict.[11] 
Taiwan is China’s top security concern,[12] and the only scenario for which China seriously 
considers the use of force. Do nuclear weapons really play a role in such a scenario? My 
judgment is “no.” If what we are talking about is a “local war under the conditions of 
internationalization,” it would be useless for China to try to deter U.S. conventional intervention 
with nuclear weapons. It is the United States, not China that has the nuclear capabilities to control 
or even dominate conflict escalation. To win a nuclear war over the United States is quite different 
from deterring a nuclear war with the United States. China is definitely the much weaker side, so 
far as the nuclear balance is concerned.  
Faced with a similar situation, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had decided the option for China 
decades ago—that is to use nuclear weapons only as a deterrent against all nuclear uses, be it 
strategic or operational. To prevent the opponent’s nuclear use is the only way to neutralize his 
nuclear superiority. China’s long standing nuclear policy still serves China’s national interests 
even today. 
Factor Three: U.S. Development and Deployment of BMD System 
China’s strong opposition to U.S. BMD development and deployment has been adequately 
conveyed and extensively studied in the United States, for this issue has been a decade-long 
topic for hot debates. Unlike other issues, Chinese concerns over BMD has had the most vocal 
and vehement expression by government officials, scholars, military officers, and even ordinary 
people who post their views in Internet chat rooms.  
On December 13, 2001, President Bush officially announced that the United States would 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty—a cornerstone arms control regime set up in the 1970s. Six 
months later, the United States was free of any legal bindings against its development and 
deployment of BMD systems. The later deployment decision by President Bush came as no 
surprise. China had succeeded in stopping the United States from setting up a missile defense 
system, which threatens to break the delicate deterrent balance between China and the United 
States. A national missile defense system, no matter how limited it would be, would no doubt 
cause a rededuction in China’s deterrent effects against U.S. nuclear use.  
American scholars always have difficulties understanding why the Chinese should worry about a 
shield to protect their own homeland. However, this very defensive shield—when used against 
the only flying dagger the opponent throws at it before taking the deadly blow—would be very 
offensive in nature. We all know the famous paradoxical logic in deterrence relations: nuclear 
force to be used as a last resort against enemy cities is defensive in nature and stabilizing in 
function, while a leak-proof umbrella against nuclear attack is offensive in nature and destabilizing.  
China is also reasonably sensitive to any BMD systems covering Taiwan. Only a limited missile 
shield would relieve Americans of possible Chinese nuclear retaliation, permitting them to 
intervene more readily and threaten nuclear use at it did in the 1958 Taiwan crisis. It could 
encourage Taiwan to take more provocative moves towards independence by reducing the 
deterrent effect of the PLA’s missile force. It would signify semi-alliance relationship between the 
United States and Taiwan. And it will reduce the effectiveness of China’s military operations 
against the island. 
China has a further reason to worry about BMD—that is BMD development cooperation, and 
future joint deployment, between the United States and Japan. This would indicate a closer 
alliance relationship and a more coordinated course of action during future Taiwan conflict 
between the two Cold War allies. An upper-tier BMD system jointly deployed by the two countries 
in the name of protecting allies and overseas troops would be readily turned into BMD systems to 
offset mainland missile attack against Taiwan. It would also be a complicating development when 
Sino-Japanese relations are getting sour, and the concern over Japan’s rearming is genuine. 
Therefore, BMD development and deployment is by far the most significant factor impacting 
China’s nuclear calculus. China has to think how to maintain a guaranteed retaliatory second 
strike capability in the face of a U.S. BMD system. It’s also necessary to review sufficiency and 
survivability of the arsenal. At the core of the Chinese concern is the credibility of the mutual 
deterrent relationship that China needs to deter American nuclear threats or nuclear use in cross-
trait conflict. 
III. Prospects for China’s Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century 
The fact that China belonged to neither of the Cold War blocs has some implication in observing 
and anticipating the future of China’s nuclear deterrence. The general rather than immediate 
nature makes it easier for China’s nuclear policy to adjust to the 21st century world. Never before 
had China fixed upon any nuclear adversaries, nor will it pick a specific nuclear enemy today. 
Even the newly emerging nuclear threat from India can be readily dealt with by existing policy. 
The issue of Taiwan has forced the Chinese to face up to the possibility of military conflict with 
the United States over Taiwan. However, such conflict should have been assumed nuclear-
irrelevant but for the issuance of the NPR by the U.S. Department of Defense.  
Through the NPR, the Chinese know for sure that in the United States' perception, China is a 
nuclear target, and Taiwan is a scenario in which nuclear weapons are to be used. Even if 
nothing could be worse for China than a nuclear confrontation with the United States, China has 
to brave itself to this, for the most vital of all vital national interests is involved here. However, it 
would be totally wrong to assume China is going to deter U.S. conventional military intervention 
by threatening nuclear use, for China can hardly make such threats credible. 
So far, the most significant factor that will influence China’s nuclear calculus will be U.S. 
deployments of national and advanced theater missile defenses. For China has to reevaluate the 
sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. missile defense systems and retain a guaranteed 
ability to retaliate. However, such reevaluation results only in the variation of the size of nuclear 
arsenals, not in the change of the policy’s basic nature. The concern in China is over the 
credibility of its retaliatory deterrence against American nuclear use. 
Both Taiwan and BMD are important factors that will have impacts on Chinese nuclear calculus:  
• The former highlights the necessity and urgency of ensuring a mutual deterrent 
relationship with the United States to prevent nuclear use in the Taiwan conflict, which 
might have not been so important or urgent before. Only in this way, has Taiwan become 
relevant to China’s nuclear policy.  
• The latter emphasizes the concern over the credibility of Chinese deterrence against the 
United States. Concerns over Taiwan and BMD combine to form the focus of China’s 
nuclear modernization—the maintenance of sufficient nuclear capabilities that can 
survive a first strike to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in a retaliatory strike.  
Put in more accurate words, China’s nuclear modernization is to keep valid its long-standing 
nuclear policy. China’s nuclear policy in the 21st century will retain all the characteristics that I 
have specified above, and suggest no deviation from the current one. So far, the three factors do 
not provide enough reasons for China to move up to the limited deterrence posture. 
Another thing that may interest us is how China would translate its nuclear deterrence 
requirement into concrete numbers (two-digit or three digit warheads and delivery vehicles). 
While this subject is beyond my capacity to discuss, I think the most important thing is to 
understand the underlying logic, not to guess at the numbers. That is, China has to keep a 
credible retaliatory nuclear force which can survive a massive first strike and launch a counter-
strike at the enemy.  
If the nuclear logic does not change fundamentally, the nature of the policy would not change. 
Slight increases or decreases in the numbers only reflect changes in calculating the sufficiency of 
the second strike capability. All three generations of Chinese leaders have expressed their intent 
to keep the arsenal small, only “at the minimum level for self-defense.” Any excess in numbers 
would be an unnecessary drain on the nation’s limited budgetary resources. On the other hand, 
even if the size of the arsenal doesn’t vary, a change in the underlying logic would trigger a major 
shift of the policy—such as a shift from a minimum to a limited deterrence posture, where nuclear 
weapons could be designed and planned for winning wars instead of deterring wars. 
The last point concerns the nuclear relationship between China and the United States. It is in 
China’s vital interests to have a certain degree of deterrent effect over other nuclear weapon 
states, be it Russia, the United States, and potentially India. At the same time, China is willing to 
accept vulnerability as its NFU policy indicates. China has been having such a deterrent 
relationship during the Cold War period with the Soviet Union from the 1970s, and later with the 
United States from mid 1980s, though the significance of such deterrent relationship lessened 
because China and the United States enjoyed an ever-improving and stable relation until 1989.  
Since the mid-1990s, both Taiwan and BMD have threatened to break such a relationship—the 
former by gaining U.S. defense commitment, the latter by offsetting China’s ability to retaliate. 
These two factors are actually American factors. If China, the United States, and all the other 
nuclear weapon states want to share regional and global security, peace and stability, they have 
to share a certain degree of insecurity first. And that means accepting some vulnerability by 
pledging to a NFU policy, so as to form a multilateral deterrent relationship among the “Haves,” 
and offering more security assurance to the “Have-nots.”  
In today’s world, security, like many other things, is relative. If one party seeks absolute and 
overwhelming superiority, it can only do so at the expense of others—which results in the loss of 
both trust and security. 
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